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ERIE TO YORK TO RAGAN-A TRIPLE PLAY ON THE
FEDERAL RULES
EDWARD LAWRENCE MERRIGAN *
Approximately twelve years have passed since the Supreme Court of
the United States promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure al-
most simultaneously with its decision in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.' These two
events revolutionized almost every phase of practice in the federal courts.
The Rules substituted uniformity for state conformity in federal procedure,
while the Erie decision required an adherence to state conformity in matters
of substantive law.
As a result of this concurrent, diverse treatment of substantive and ad-
jective law, it was assumed that the Court intended, in future diversity of
citizenship cases, to recognize the dichotomy of substance and procedure. This
recognition was certainly necessary if the conflicting doctrines of Erie and
the Rules of Procedure were to be given full application within the boundaries
seemingly established for them by the Court in 1938.2 Since 1945, however,
-it has become increasingly apparent that the Court does not intend to be
bound by any imaginary line of demarcation between substance and pro-
cedure. In 1949, this fact was demonstrated beyond any doubt, when the Court
rendered three decisions which extended the doctrine of the Erie case in
such a way that state law was made to govern several matters already specif-
ically covered by the Federal Rules.3
The Erie invasion of the Rules has brought about a general uncertainty
and confusion which undoubtedly matches that which caused the Court to
overrule the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson4 in 1938. Practising attorneys are
1. 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
2. 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 24 (Supp. 1945), where it is stated: "... . it is well to
remember at this point that the term procedure must be given a workable construction or
the Federal rules will be devitalized and procedural reform thwarted at the outset...."
See also, Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, 1 F.R.D. 417 (1940), 24
J. Aii. JuD. Soc. 158 (1941), where the writer argues for prima facie validity of the
rules; and Note, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 62 HARV. L. REv.
1030, 1032 (1949). Compare Note, 38 COL. L. R~v. 1472, 1474 (1938) : "There appears to
be a latent conflict between the policy of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins-that there shall be
coformnity of rules of decision .... and the policy of the Federal Rules-that there shall
be uniform and liberal rules of practice in the federal courts. To the extent that a sat-
isfactory line cannot be drawn between the "substantive" sphere of the Erie case and the"procedural" sphere of the Federal Rules, attempted resolution of this conflict of
policy must be also unsatisfactoiy."
3. The three decisions were in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Company,
Inc., 337 U.S. 530, 69 Sup. Ct. 1233, 93 L. Ed. 1520 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty
Co., 337 U.S. 535, 69 Sup. Ct. 1235, 93 L. Ed. 1524 (1949); and Cohen v. Beneficial In-
dustrial Loan Corporation, 337 U.S. 541, 69 Sup. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949).
4. 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (U.S. 1842).
• Member, Louisiana and New York Bars.
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unable to determine which of the Federal Rules will remain in full effect,
and which might be rejected by the courts on the theory that they con-
flict in a substantial way with some state law. Every important step in a
federal diversity case is taken today at a calculated risk. Litigants must con-
stantly decide whether this procedure, or that procedure, should be taken
in accordance with the Rules or as prescribed by state law. Some have
concluded that the methods established by both systems of law should be
pursued-assuming, of course, that such pursuit is possible.5
This article is written with the hope that it may contribute to the elimina-
tion of this unfortunate situation. Initially, the Erie decision and the events
which led to the adoption of the Federal Rules will be discussed briefly.
Then follows an analysis of the important decisions of the Supreme Court
which have tended to Erietompkinize many of the Federal Rules. Finally,
a solution to* the existing problem is proposed. This solution might be
adopted by the Supreme Court or Congress in order to clarify federal prac-
tice and to insure that justice, not procedural technicality, will prevail in all
future diversity of citizenship cases.
A BRiE FLASHBACK TO 1938
Anyone remotely connected with the practice or study of law is familiar
with the opinion in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins. 6 That famous decision, ren-
dered in 1938, is one of the most discussed cases in the Supreme Court's
history. One eminent circuit judge has repeatedly stated: "I don't suppose
a civil appeal can now be argued to us without counsel sooner or later quot-
ing large portions of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins." 7 The Federal Rules have
likewise received considerable attention from legal scholars, and every
practising attorney should be cognizant of their contents and operation.
Thus, the only purpose of this review of the events which caused the Court
to establish the Erie doctrine and promulgate the Rules in 1938 is to con-
struct briefly a foundation for the subsequent discussion of the recent de-
cisions by the Court affecting the Rules themselves.
5. In Nola Electric, Inc. v. Reilly, Civil No. 44-396, U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, a very distinguished member of the New York Bar
argued after the Ragan and Cohen decisions that a diversity action in New York should
be commenced pursuant to both the provisions of Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules,
and the provisions of the New York Civil Practice Act, Sect. 17; that where state
law called for commencement of an action by delivering the summons to a state sheriff
for service plaintiff was under an obligation to comply with that requirement, and with
Rule 4, by having the Court appoint the state sheriff as a person capable of serving the
federal summons. The court dismissed this contention, and decided that plaintiff complied
with both state and federal law by delivering the federal summons to the United States
Marshal for service.
6. 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
7. The statement is attributed to Judge Learned Hand by Judge Charles E. Clark,
in State Law in The Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins,
55 YALE L. J. 267, 269 (1946). Both judges are members of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.
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The basic statute underlying the decision in the Erie case is Section
34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.8 It provides that "the laws of the several
states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or acts
of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of de-
cision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply." In Swift v. Tyson,9 decided by the Supreme Court in 1842, Mr.
Justice Story held that the word "laws" in Section 34 referred only to statutes
enacted by state legislatures, and that federal tribunals were not bound to fol-
low decisions of the various state courts. The doctrine' of Swift v. Tyson
was summed up by Justice Story as follows:
"Undoubtedly, the decisions of the local tribunals ...are entitled to, and will
receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this Court; but they cannot furnish
positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which our own judgments are to be bound up
and governed." "
Mr. Justice Story's theory was followed by the federal courts for almost
a century. It was subjected to vigorous attack in 1923, when Charles Warren
showed that Story's decision in Swift v. Tyson was founded upon a mis-
conception of the Judiciary Act itself.'1 He revealed that it was Congress'
intention, at the time it enacted Section 34, that the word "laws" was to in-
clude the unwritten common law of the several states, as well as their statutory
law.' 2 Criticism of Story's doctrine became widespread after the Supreme
Court's decision in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Company.13 There, a Kentucky corporation by
the mere device of re-incorporating in Tennessee and thereby creating di-
versity of citizenship between it and its main competitor, enforced a contract
in federal court, which would have been absolutely void if sued upon in a
Kentucky state court. This sort of discrimination in favor of a noncitizen
corporation against a citizen, solely because of diversity jurisdiction, prompted
the Supreme Court to overrule Swift v. Tyson, and establish the following
canon ip Erie R. R. v. Tompkins:
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the
8. 1 STAT. 92, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1652 (1948).
9. 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (U.S. 1842).
10. 16 Pet. at 19.
11. See Warren, iVewc Lqht on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HAiy. L. REv. 49 (1923).
12. See id. at 86-87.
13. 276 U.S. 518, 48 Sup. Ct. 404, 72 L. Ed. 681, 57 A.L.R. 426 (1928). See also,
Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between Federal and State Courts, 13
CORNPLL L. Q. 449, 524-30 (1928); Johnson, State Law and the Federal Courts,
17 Ky. L. J. 355 (1929); Fordham, The Federal Courts and Construction of Uniform
State Laws, 7 N.C. L. REv. 423 (1929); Dobie, Seven Implications of Swift v. Tyson,
16 VA. L. Rzv. 225 (1930); Shelton, Concurrent Jurisdiction-Its Necessity and Its
Dangers, 15 VA. L. REv. 137 (1928).
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State shall- be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a de-
cision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law.
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a
State whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part
of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power
upon the federal courts.""
Thus, in 1938, the Story plan for a nationally uniform common law
was replaced by the Erie doctrine of state conformity. The Court justified
this drastic change-over by saying that, in addition to all of its other weak-
nesses, the Story doctrine could never have attained its goal-a uniform
American common law. The Court pointed out that state courts had refused
to follow federal decisions as Story had hoped they would, and as a result
Swift v. Tyson simply complicated the common law of this country and
caused confusion among jurists, litigants and counsel. 15
While federal courts, prior to the Erie decision, were applying the doe-
trine of Swift v. Tyson in matters of substantive law, they were following
state law in matters of procedure, pursuant to the provisions of the Con-
formity Act.' 6 This law, enacted by Congress, provided that federal prac-
tice and procedure in all civil cases other than equity and admiralty causes,
had to conform "as near as may be" to practice in like causes in state courts
wherein the federal courts sat. As early as 1911, the American Bar As-
sociation initiated a movement, the purpose of which was to do away with
the Conformity Act, and replace it with a uniform system of federal pro-
cedure.17 In 1912 and almost yearly thereafter bills were introduced in
Congress, seeking adoption of the idea.
Finally, in 1934, Congress passed the Enabling Act,' 8 which authorized
the Supreme Court to prescribe general rules for practice and procedure
in the federal district courts. In June, 1935, the Court appointed an ad-
14. 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
15. 304 U.S. at 74.
16. 17 STAT. 197, 28 U.S.C.A. § 724. It provided that federal practice, pleadings,
and forms and modes of preceedings in other than equity and admiralty causes had to
conform as near as may be to practice in like causes in courts of record in states
wherein the federal courts sat.
17. See 37 A.B.A. RP. 434, 435 (1912). The resolution passed by the Bar Associa-
tion provided: "Whereas [the Conformity Act] has utterly failed to bring about a
general uniformity in federal and state proceedings in civil cases, and whereas, it is
believed that the advantages of state remedies can be better obtained by a permanent
uniform system, with the necessary rules of practice prepared by the United States
Supreme Court, therefore, be it Resolved, that a complete uniform system of law
pleading should prevail in the federal and state courts, and that a system of rules for
use in the federal courts and to serve as models for state adoption should be prelared
and put into effect by the Supreme Court of the United States." For an excellent
summary of the history of the Federal Rules, see Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-
Making Power to the Supreme Court of the United States, 32 Micn. L. Rav. 1116 (1934).
18. 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (1948). "The Supreme Court shall have
the power to prescribe, by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and
motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts of the United States . . .
in civil actions. Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantivo
right. .. '
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visory committee to prepare and submit to the Court a draft of a unified
system of rules. With the aid and suggestions of members of the Bar, the
Advisory Committee prepared a preliminary draft in 1936, a second draft
in April, 1937, and a final report in November, 1937. The final report was
accepted by the Supreme Court, and was submitted to Congress. Hearings
were held before the judiciary -committees of the House of Representatives
and the Senate. Congress made no changes in the Rules, and they were
promulgated by the Court in 1938, shortly before its decision in the Erie
case.19
From the foregoing brief summary of the events which led the Court
to establish the Erie doctrine and promulgate the Federal Rules, it is clear
that the Court so acted because of distinctly independent forces. The two
pronouncements were based upon separate desires and reasoning. Erie was
born because of the failures of Swift v. Tyson, and because of the Court's
former misinterpretation of Section 34 of the Judiciary Act. The Federal
Rules, on the other hand, were adopted to satisfy the almost universal de-
sire in this country for state and federal uniformity of procedure. The Court
in 1938 must not have foreseen fully the possibility that Erie and the Rules, by
reason of their conflicting aims and theories, would clash at many points
in those zones of the law which are not clearly substantive and not clearly
procedural. It seems that the Court firmly believed that Erie and the Rules
could live happily together in diversity cases because of the ever-present line
of demarcation between matters of substance and matters of procedure. Mr.
Justice Reed so implied in his concurring opinion in the Erie -case, where
he stated: "The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy but no
one doubts federal power over procedure." 20
Moreover, the Enabling Act, from which the Court derived its power
to adopt the Federal Rules, specifically provides that any rules promulgated
by the Court shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive
rights of any. litigant.21 It is to be presumed, therefore, that the Court kept
this provision of the Act in mind when it accepted the Rules of Procedure,
and that the Court considered all matters contained therein as properly
within the realm of procedural law. As we shall see in the next sections of
this article, the Court has not adhered to the dichotomy of substance and
procedure, and as a result, it has allowed the Erie doctrine to take ito its
fold many matters specifically covered by the Federal Rules.
19. See historical commentary following Rule 1 of the Federal Rules, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 723c (1941).
20. 304 U.S. 64; 92, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).
21. See note 18 supra.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
YORK DISCARDS THE DICHOTOMY OF SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE
During the years frol 1938 to 1945, jurists and scholars expressed in-
creasingly their anxiety that the Court might destroy procedural uniformity
by failing to adhere strictly to the divide which apparently had been es-
tablished between substantive law and procedure. 22 For instance, Judge
Clark of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote, in October,
1940:
"Personally I would put it that the federal rules may be decidedly endangered if
certain views of the wide scope of substance and the narrow extent of procedure .. .
should prevail; but I would add that such an outcome does not seem to me a necessary
result of the Tompkins case." 23
Finally, in 1945, the Supreme Court handed down an opinion which
demonstrated the Court's intention not to abide by any imaginary division
between substance and procedure. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York24 was an
equity action brought in federal court solely because of diversity of citizen-
ship. The defendant bank interposed as a defense the New York statute of
limitations. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals had held that, in a suit
brought on the equity side of a federal court, the court was not required to
apply a state statute of limitations.2 5 The circuit court so concluded because
it found limitations to be a matter of procedural or remedial law, and in that
case, the federal "equitable remedial rights" doctrine governed, and not
the rule of Eric v. Tompkins.
26
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the circuit court was over-
ruled. Relying upon the Erie doctrine, the Court directed application of
the New York statute of limitations. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the
Court, stated:
"Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins was not an endeavor to formulate scientific legal term-
inology. It expressed a policy that touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial
power between State and federal courts. In essence, the intent of that decision was to
insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because
of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the
federal court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the out-
22. See Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, 1 F.R.D. 417 (1940),
24 J. Amf. JUD. Soc. 158 (1941) ; Tunks, Cateqoriz-ation and Federalism: "Substance"
and "Procedure" after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 IL.. L. REV. 271 (1939) ; Shil-
man, The Demise of Swift -z. Tyson, 47 YALE L.J. 1336 (1938) ; Notes and articles
collected in 1 FED. RULES SERV. 860-67.
23. Clark, supra note 22, 1 F.R.D. at 418.
24. 326 U.S. 99. 65 Sup. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 2079, 160 A.L.R. 1231 (1945).
25. 143 F.2d 503, 528 (2d Cir. 1944).
26. For an excellent discussion of "the equitable remedial rights doctrine," see
Note, 55 YALE L. J. 401 (1946); see also Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212, 222,
4 L. Ed. 372 (U.S. 1818); Kirby v. Lake Shore & M.S.R.R., 120 U.S. 130, 7 Sup. Ct.
430, 30 L. Ed. 569 (1887); Guffy v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101, 35 Sup. Ct. 526, 59 L. Ed.
856 (1915); Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 60 Sup. Ct. 527, 84 L. Ed. 754 (1940).
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come of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court. The nub of the policy that
underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a
suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a block
away should not lead to a substantially different result." 27
The Court was most definite in its conclusion that the line" separating
substance and procedure did not furnish a point from which federal courts
could decide the type of law to be applied in each diversity case. In this con-
nection, Justice Frankfurter stated:
"Matters of 'substance' and matters of 'procedure' are much talked about in the
books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law.
But, of course, 'substance' and 'procedure' are the same keywords to very different
problems. Neither 'substance' nor 'procedure' represents the same invariants ...
"And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of
'procedure' in some sense. The question is whether such a statute concerns merely the
manner and the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is en-
forced, or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect that
alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a
litigation for-a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in
an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court?" _2
Thus, no longer was it a question of where the line between substance
and procedure was to be placed. The entire "dichotomy theory" was aban-
doned by the Court, and a new test was established to control the determina-
tion of whether or not the rule of the Erie case was to be applied. The fed-
eral courts were directed, in each instance, to decide whether the result of a
litigation would be affected substantially if some provisions of state law were
not followed, in favor of an adherence to federal procedural or remedial law.
If a conflict between the two systems is found to exist, then the federal
courts seem duty-bound to apply state law, under the doctrine of the Erie
case, as extended by Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.
The York case, of necessity, spelled death to the hope for a completely
uniform federal procedure. When its doctrine is logically applied, each im-
portant step in a diversity action must be examined in the light of two
systems of law-first, under the Federal Rules, and then under the law of
the state in which the federal court sits. In one state, a particular Rule might
not clash with a local law or decision which significantly bears upon the out-
come of a litigation. Under such circumstances, the Rule should prevail, al-
though the determination as to its applicability is actually made under state
law. In another state, the same Rule might conflict in some substantial way
with that state's policy or law. In such instances, state law, and not the Rule,
will govern a federal court's decision. This unhappy fact was realized by the
27. 326 U.S. 99, 109, 65 Sup. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 2079, 160 A.L.R. 1231 (1945).
28. Id. at 108-9.
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late Mr. Justice Rutledge, who wrote a lengthy dissent in the York case, in
which he stated:
"More is at stake in the implications of the decision, if not in the words of the
opinion, than simply bringing federal and local law into accord upon matters clearly
and exclusively within the constitutional power of the state to determine." 11
Justice Rutledge felt that the Court had seriously erred in failing to
abide by the dichotomy of substance and procedure. He stated that the "large
division between adjective law and substantive law still remains, to divide
the power of Congress [over procedure] from that of the states and conse-
quently to determine the power of the federal courts to apply federal law
or state law in diversity matters." 30 Rutledge stood firm in this position, and
dissented consistently against the Court's extensions of the Erie doctrine.
THE ERIE INVASION OF THE FEDERAL RULES
After the decision in Guaranty Trust Co. z,. York, it was only a matter of
time until several of the Federal Rules would necessarily be delimited or over-
ruled by the Supreme Court. This fact was reluctantly admitted by most of
the writers who pondered over the fate of the Rules during the period from
1945 to 1949.31 On JIune 20, 1949, the expected occurred. Simultaneously, the
Court handed -down three decisions which actually brought uniformity in
federal procedure to an end.
32
The first decision, Ragan z. Merchants Transfer & W'arehouse Comn-
pany, Inc.,3 3 concerned Rule 3 of the Federal Rules, which provides: "A civil
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court." The Ragai
case involved a highway accident which occurred on October 1, 1943. On
September 1, 1945, suit was instituted in the federal district for Kansas, and
jurisdiction was predicated solely upon diversity of citizenship. The action
was commenced in accordance with Rule 3, but service was not made until
December 28, 1945. Kansas has a two-year statute of limitations applicable
to such tort claims.34 Defendant pleaded the statute and moved for summary
29. Id. at 115.
30. Id. at 116.
31. See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: the Brooding Omnipresence of
Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 288 (1946); Note, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and
the Federal Rules, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1030 (1949).
32. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 69 Sup. Ct.
1233, 93 L. Ed. 1520 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 69 Sup.
Ct. 1235, 93 L. Ed. 1524 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 69 Sup. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949). See Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey and Day,
Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494 (1949). The authors went so far as to state: "These
decisions spell the death of diversity litigation in the federal courts and compel those
courts to follow state procedure in diversity cases. The only hope for the future lies
in the dissent of justice Rutledge." Id. at 531.
33. 337 U.S. 530, 69 Sup. Ct. 1233, 93 L. Ed. 1520 (1949).
34. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 60-306 (1935).
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judgment. Plaintiff claimed that filing of the complaint pursuant to Rule
3 commenced the action and tolled the statute. Defendant argued that, by
reason of a Kansas statute, the statute of limitations was not tolled until serv-
ice of the summons. 35 The district court denied defendant's motion, and
after a trial, verdict was entered in favor of plaintiff. The Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit reversed,3 6 ruling that the requirement of service of
summons within the statutory period was an integral part of the state's
statute of limitations, which, under the Erie and York decisions, should be
applied in federal diversity cases. The Supreme Court upheld the decision
of the court of appeals. The Court held that "if recovery could not be had
in the state court, it should be denied in federal court." With regard to Rule
3, the Court stated:
"Here, there can be no doubt that the suit was properly commenced in the federal
court. But in the present case we look to local law to find the cause of action on which
suit is brought. Since that cause of action is created by local law, the measure of it is
to be found only in local law. It carries the same burden and is subject to the same de-
fenses in the federal court as in the state court. . . . It accrues and comes to an end
when local law so declares .... Where local law qualifies or abridges it, the federal
court must follow suit. Otherwise there is a different measure of the cause of action
in one court than in the other, and the principle of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkims is trans-
gressed." 17
It is noteworthy that the Court also held in the Ragan case that Rule 3
still prevails in cases involving only a federal question. In such a case, ir-
respective pf state requirements, the action is still commenced and the appli-
cable statute of limitations tolled by the mere filing of the complaint.38 In
sum and substance, therefore, the Court delimited Rule 3 in diversity of
citizenship cases, but preserved it for all other types of civil actions. As a re-
sult, all "strictly federal" civil cases will now be governed by Rule 3, while
diversity cases must of necessity be commenced in accordance with prevail-
ing state law. Under such circumstances, uniformity of procedure is a thing
of the past insofar as commencement of actions in federal court is concerned.
The Ragan decision must have proved particularly ungratifying to Mr.
Ragan himself. As mentioned above, he obtained a substantial judgment on
the merits of his action in the lower federal court, but was prevented from
recovering solely by reason of the confusion and uncertainty arising from
35. Id. § 60-308, which provides: "An action shall be deemed commenced within
the meaning of this article, as to each defendant, at the date of the summons which
is served on him ... "
36. 170 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1948).
37. 337 U.S. at 533.
38. The Court made reference to Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947).
That case was a suit to enforce rights under a federal statute. The Court made it clear,
therefore, that its holding in the Ragan action was limited to diversity cases, and that
Rule 3 remained in effect as far as other federal civil actions were concerned.
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procedural technicalities and by the initial engulfment of a Federal Rule
by Erie and York.
The second case decided by the Court on June 20, 1949, concerned Rule
17(b) of the Federal Rules. This rule provides, in part: "The capacity of a
corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under which it
was organized." The case, Woods v. Interstate Realty Company,"9 was com-
menced in federal district court in Mississippi on the ground of diversity of
citizenship. Plaintiff, a Tennessee corporation, sued a resident of Mississippi
to recover a brokerage commission alleged to be due upon the sale of real
estate located in Mississippi. Defendant moved for summary judgment,
claiming that under a Mississippi statute40 the action was barred because plain-
tiff corporation had failed to qualify to do business in Mississippi. The dis-
trict court sustained the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed.41 It reviewed Mississippi decisions under the statute, and con-
cluded that they barred actions by foreign corporations in the state courts
only.42 In reliance upon the rule established by the Supreme Court in David
Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club,43 the court of appeals held that a
state statute, thus interpreted by state courts, did not close the doors of a
federal court sitting in that state.
Shortly thereafter, however, the Supreme Court handed down its de-
cision in Angel v. Bullington.4 4 In that case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writ-
ing for the Court, stated:
"Cases like Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club . . . are obsolete insofar
as they are based on a view of diversity jurisdiction which came to an end with Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins. . . . That decision drastically limited the power of federal
district courts to entertain suits in diversity cases that could not be brought in the
respective State courts or were barred by defenses controlling in the State courts." "'
The defendant, in the Woods case, immediately moved for reargument
39. 337 U.S. 535, 69 Sup. Ct. 1235, 93 L. Ed. 1524 (1949).
40. Miss. COD § 5319 (1942), requires a foreign corporation doing business in
the State to file a written power of attorney designating an agent on whom service
of process may be had. It also provides, "Any foreign corporation failing to comply
with the above provisions shall not be permitted to bring or maintain any action or
suit in any of the courts of this state."
41. 168 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1948).
42. The cases relied upon were Long Beach Canning Co. v. Clark. 141 Miss. 177,
106 So. 646 (1926) ; and Citizen's Bank of Hattiesburg v. Grigsby, 170 Miss. 655, 155
So. 684 (1934).
43. 225 U.S. 489, 32 Sup. Ct. 711, 56 L. Ed. 1177 (1912). In the Lupton case, the
question and facts presented were substantially the same. Mr. Justice Hughes, writing
for the Court, stated, "The State could not prescribe the qualifications of suitors in
the courts of the United States, and could not deprive of their privileges those who
were entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States to resort to the
Federal courts for the enforcement of a valid contract." 225 U.S. at 500. In connection
with the Lupton case, see Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between United
States and State Courts, 13 CORNLL L.Q. 499, 524-25 (1928). As early as 1928,
Justice Frankfurter expressed his disapproval of the Lupton case.
44. 330 U.S. 183, 67 Sup. Ct. 657, 91 L. Ed. 832 (1947).
45. 330 U.S. at 192.
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in the circuit court, claiming that the Lupton case had been overruled. The
circuit court stood firm in its former position, holding that the Angel case was
decided by the res judicata doctrine, and the remainder of the decision was
simply obiter dicta.
46
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the court of appeals naturally was
reversed. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, held that the Lupton
case had been overruled by Angel v. Bullington. He therefore dismissed the
action in the Woods case, on the theory that "where ... one is barred from
recovery in the state court, he should likewise be barred in the federal
court." 47
The Court did not specifically mention Rule 17(b) in its decision in the
Woods case. 'Yet the provisions of that Rule pertaining to the capacity of
corporations to sue and be sued were nevertheless effectively delimited by
the Woods decision. First of all the provisions of that Rule on corporate
capacity were inserted by the Advisory Committee 48 in reliance upon the
Court's decision in David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club.49 The
Supreme Court expressly overruled that decision in Angel v. Bullington and
again in the Woods case. Moreover, the net effect of the decision in the Woods
case is that in diversity actions a foreign corporation's capacity to sue must
now be determined by the law of the state in which it seeks to sue, and not
in accordance with the laws of the state of its incorporation. As stated
above, Rule 17(b) provides that a corporation's capacity to sue is to be de-
termined under the laws of the place of its incorporation. Thus, another Fed-
eral Rule succumbed to the Erie doctrine insofar as diversity cases are con-
cerned, and uniformity of procedure in the federal courts received another
blow.
The third decision handed down by the Court on June 20, 1949, was
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation.5 ° This case applied pro-
visions of New Jersey law in such a way as to add new requirements to
those of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules. The action was brought by minority
shareholders of a corporation to recover from defendants, managers and
directors of the corporation, the sum of $100,000 for waste and diversion of
corporate assets. Federal jurisdiction was predicated upon diversity of
citizenship. The action was brought in 1943. Various proceedings had taken
place when, in 1945, New Jersey enacted a statute,51 the effect of which was to
make a plaintiff in a stockholder's action liable for all expenses and at-
torneys' fees of the defense in the event he failed to make good his com-
46. 170 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1948).
47. 337 U.S. at 538.
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b). See Notes of Advisory Committee, p. 503.
49. 225 U.S. 489, 32 Sup. Ct. 711, 56 L. Ed. 1177 (1912).
50. 337 U.S. 541, 69 Sup. Ct. 1221, 93 L. Ed. 1528 (1949).
51. N.J. Laws 1945, c. 131.
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plaint. Moreover, corporate defendants in such cases were given the right
to require a bond or other indemnity before the suit could be prosecuted. The
statute, by its terms, ,was made applicable to those actions already pending
when it became effective. The corporate defendant in the Cohen case prompt-
ly moved to require security from the plaintiffs, and claimed that a bond of
$125,000 was apprQpriate. The district court denied the motion, holding
that the New Jersey statute was- not, applicable to cases in federal court.52 The
court of appeals was of contrary opinion and reversed.5 3 The Supreme Court
thereupon granted certiorari, and in due course sustained the ruling of the
court of appeals. In holding that the federal court was bound to apply the
New Jersey statute, Mrs. Justice Jackson stated:
"[T]his statute is not merely a regulation or procedure. With it or without
it the main action takes the same course. However, it creates a new liability where
none existed before, for it makes a stockholder who institutes a derivative action
liable for the expense to which he puts the corporation and other defendants, if he
does not make good his claims. . . . We do not think a statute which so conditions
the stockholder's action can be disregarded by, the federal court as a mere procedural
device." "
Concerning plaintiff's claim that the New Jersey statute was strictly pro-
cedural, that he had complied with all of the applicable requirements of the
Federal Rules, and that Rule 23 exclusively governs procedure in share-
holders' actions in federal court, Mr. Justice Jackson stated:
"It is urged . . . that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure No. 23 deals with plaintiff's
right to maintain such an action in federal court and that therefore the subject is
. recognized as procedural and the federal rule alone prevails .... These provisions [of
Rule 23] neither create nor exempt from liabilities, but require complete disclosure to
the court and notice to the parties in interest. None conflict with the statute in question
and all may be observed by a federal court, even if not applicable in state court." 03
The practical effect of the Court's decision is that parties in future di-
versity cases will naturally seek to avail themselves of the many ancillary
procedural rights and benefits provided by various state laws. The Supreme
Court has not stated how far it plans to extend the Erie doctrine in this
direction. So, as matters stand, lower federal courts and practising attorneys
must determine for themselves whether or not state laws providing security
for costs, special attachments, injunctions pendente lite, body arrests and the
like should be applicable in federal diversity cases. Shareholders' actions are
particularly hazardous at this time as a result of the Cohen decision. De-
fendants in such cases will probably seek to inject every feasible state re-
quirement into federal practice, while plaintiffs will probably argue as
52. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 7 F.R.D. 352 (D.N.J. 1947).
53. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 170 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1948).
54. 337 U.S. at 555-56.
55. Id. at 556.
[ VOL. 3
1950] A TRIPLE PLAY ON THE'FEDERAL RULES 723
Justices Douglas and Frankfurter did, in their dissenting opinion in the
Cohen case, that Rule 23 governs procedure in such actions exclusively, and
that the Cohen ruling should not be extended by the federal courts.
Since the Supreme Court rendered its decisions in the Ragan, Woods and
Cohen cases, the lower federal courts and the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules itself have dealt further blows to the doctrine of uniformity
of procedure. In Nola Electric Ivc. v. Reilly,5 6 the district court for the
southern district of New York decided, on September 30, 1949, that the
action there was commenced, not by filing of the complaint under Rule
3, but by delivery of the summons to the United States Marshal with the
intent that service upon the defendant be made. The court applied the rule
of the Ragan case, by holding that where state law provides that an action
is commenced by delivery'of the summons to a state sheriff for service, 57 the
state provisions are to be followed by litigants in federal court. The court
reasoned that a state sheriff was wholly without authority to serve a federal
summons. Consequently, the court held that, under such circumstances, fed-
eral litigants need only conform as near as possible to state law, with the
result that delivery of the summons to the United States Marshal was suf-
ficient. This decision is undoubtedly correct as it is founded upon sound
logic and a long line of like interpretations of the applicable New York law.58
The district court in the Nola case also passed upon the applicability of
Rule 15(c) in cases based solely upon diversity of citizenship. This Rule
provides that whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended plead-
ing arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted
to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to
the date of the original pleading. In the Nola case, plaintiff filed an
amended complaint after the applicable statute of limitations had expired.
Defendant moved to dismiss the amended pleading on the grouhd that it
was outlaved by reason of the statute. The district court originally enter-
tained this motion prior to the Supreme Court's decision in the Ragan case.
Relying upon Rule 15 (c), it denied the motion, and held that the amended com-
plaint related back to the date of the initial pleading. After the Ragan de-
56. This case is unreported. It bears Civil No. 44-396 in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York. The decision was rendered by Judge Sylvester
J. Ryan on September 30, 1949.
57. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 17, which provides: "An attempt to commence an
action . . . is equivalent to the commencement thereof . . . within the meaning of each
provision of this act which limits the time for commencing an action, when the summons
is delivered, with the intent that it shall be actually served, to the sheriff . .. of the
county in which the defendant . . . resides."
58. See Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947); United States v. Northern
Finance Corp., 16 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1927); Acheson Graphite Co. v. Mellon, 21 F.2d
562 (W.D.N.Y. 1927); United States v. Elliott, 27 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y. 1939);
United States v. Fischer, 16 F. Supp. 743 (E.D.N.Y. 1936); Knox v.- Beckford, 167
Misc. 200, 3 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Albany City Ct. 1938), aff'd inent., 258 App. Div. 823,
aff'd inem., 285 N.Y. 762, 34 N.E.2d 911 (1941).
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cision, however, defendant moved for reargument. The district court re-
versed its prior decision, stating:
"It does not require a scryer to foresee that the logical extension of the doctrine
of the Ragan decision requires that this question be decided in accordance with statfi-
tory and case law of New York."
Thus, the court refused to apply Rule 15(c) to determine whether or
not relation back of the amendment was proper. However, the defendant's
motion was again denied by the court on the ground that the New York
decisions have adopted the same reasoning as contained in Rule 15(c) with
regard to amended pleadings.
59
Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules has been involved in a tug-of-war
with Erie for many years. It provides, among other things, that in share-
holders' actions, the complainant "shall aver that plaintiff was a shareholder
at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share there-
after devolved on him by operation of law." Several states, however, have
laws which permit parties to maintain such actions although they acquired
their corporate shares subsequent to the date of the transaction complained
of. The decisions of the lower federal courts on this question are divided.
Some hold that the question is procedural and therefore should be governed
solely by Rule 23(b) in diversity actions. 60 Others hold that the matter
is one of substance, and that state provisions, not Rule 23(b), are control-
ling.61 Recently, the Advisory Committee on the Rules took cognizance of
the situation, and issued a supplementary note to Rule 23, which states, in
part, as follows:
"As a result of the decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins .... a question has arisen
as to whether [Rule 23(b)] deals with a matter of substantive right or is a matter of
procedure. If it is a matter of substantive law or right, then under Erie R. Co. v. Tonip-
kins [Rule 23(b)] may not be validly applied in cases pending in states whose local
law permits a shareholder to maintain such actions, although not a shareholder at
the time of the transactions complained of. The Advisory Committee, believing the
question should be settled in the courts, proposes no change in Rule 23. . ,, 02
Naturally enough, the position taken by the Advisory Committee has
caused uncertainty and confusion. As a result of the Committee's failure to
59. See Michelson v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Harriss v. Tams,
258 N.Y. 229, 242, 179 N.E. 476 (1932); Clark v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 259
App. Div. 136, 18 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1st Dep't 1940).
60. See Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1941); Perrott v. United
States Banking Corp., 53 F. Supp. 953 (D. Del. 1944) ; Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 36 F.
Supp. 1006, 1009-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), aff'd, 120 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1941).
61. Summers v. Hearst, 23 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Bankers Nat. Corp.
v. Barr, 9 Fed. Rules Serv. 23(b) 11, Case 1.
62. See Supplementary Note of Advisory Committee, Regarding Rule 23(b),
28 U.S.C.A. 723c, following Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Supp.
1950). See also Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494, 506-08 (1949) ; Note, 62 HARV. L. RaV.
1030, 1038-39 (1949).
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act or to take a stand in the matter after recognizing the existence of the
problem, litigants, at great expense in time and money, must continue to
proceed in such cases without knowing which position the Supreme Court
will adopt with regard to Rule 23(b).
The Erie doctrine was also extended recently to operate in place of
Rule 14 of the Federal Rules which provides for third party practice in the
federal courts. In Hills v. Price,6 3 the District Court for the Eastern District
of South Carolina refused to allow a defendant to bring in a joint tortfeasor
as a third-party defendant under the provisions of this Rule. The Court
stated:
"Under the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, . .. we must look to the law of
South Carolina to determine the rights of the parties; that is, the substantive rights,
and not merely the rules of procedure in the matter of making third party de-
fendants.... I have therefore reached the conclusion that the motion to bring in the
third party defendant should be refused." 64
Space does not permit an analysis of the other provisions of the Federal
Rules which might conflict substantially with the laws of one or more of the
48 states. It is submitted, however, that there are many other Rules, such as
Rules 1,65 13(a) 66 and 41(a) 67 which are susceptible to rejection or de-
limitation as a result of the current extensions of the Erie doctrine to mat-
ters which heretofore have been considered strictly procedural.
A PROPosED RETURN TO CONFORMITY
The solution to the federal procedure problem will not be a simple one.
The entire question cannot be eliminated and cleared up by'simply amend-
63. 79 F. Stipp. 494 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
64. Id. at 495, 497.
65. Rule 1 provides: "These rules govern the procedure in the district courts of
the United States in all suits of a civil nature. . . ." 28 U.S.C.A. 723c, Rule 1. Lengthy
explanation is unnecessary to show that this Rule has lost its original meaning. Already
state law, not the Rules, governs the procedure of commencement, relation back of
amendments, third party practice, etc., in many diversity cases.
66. Rule 13(a) compels defendants to state a certain type of claim as a counter-
claim in their answers. In Lesnik v. Public Industrial Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 975 (2d
Cir. 1944), the court of appeals understood this provision to bar a defendant who fails
to plead such a counterclaim from suing on it later in a separate suit in fedral or
state court. This Rule, so interpreted, certainly has substantial effect upon the outcome
of litigations, for the result of such application is to make the federal court judgment
in a prior suit res judicata as to the subsequent claim. In states which do not have such
a rule, federal courts would seem bound by the Erie doctrine to apply state law and
reject Rule 13(a).
67. Rule 41 (a) provides that "a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court in the
United States or of any state an action based on or including the same claim." 28
U.S.C.A. § 723c, Rule 41(a) (1). Under the Erie doctrine, as extended by York and
Ragan, this rule is extremely vulnerable to rejection in diversity cases, where a state
law or decision conflicts therewith. In this connection, see Missouri Pac. Transp. Co.
v. Taley, 199 Ark. 835, 136 S.W.2d 688 (1940), petition for certiorari dismissed on
motion of petitioner, 311 U.S. 722 (1940).
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ing Rule 3 because of the Ragan decision, or Rule 17(b) as a result of the
Woods case, or Rule 23(b) by reason of the Cohen decision. These rules are
not the only ones which conflict with Erie. As shown above, the lower courts
have already commenced the Erie attack on other provisions of the Rules,
and as a result, Rules 14 and 15(c) have been delimited or overruled in di-
versity cases. The problem does not exist because of the provisions of any
particular Federal Rule, but rather by reason of the conflicting theories and
doctrines supporting the Rules as a whole and Erie R. R. v. Tompkins. As
long as Erie governs substantive matters in federal cases involving state-
created rights and liabilities, there will be a clash between it and the Rules
in all matters which in any way substantially affect the outcome of such
litigations.
Just as amendments of particular rules would seemingly offer no solution,
the adoption of an arbitrary test to govern all situations would likewise seem
unworkable. For example, the following test was recently offered as a so-
lution to the problem:
"The federal courts under Erie are required to apply, in the resolution of suits
involving the enforcement of state-created rights, all those rules of state law, which, if
they were different in the federal courts, would more likely than not lead to or en-
courage forum-shopping." "
Any such test or rule would seemingly create greater uncertainty and
confusion than that which presently exists. Jurists and litigants would be
compelled in each case to compare state and federal law, and without any
definite guide or precedent, come to a conclusion as to which law should
control. Each step from the commencement of an action to the submission
of the case to a jury would necessarily be taken at a risk, and parties would
be justified in appealing to the higher courts from any decision on the ground
that the court erred in applying some provision of federal law where it should
have applied state law and vice versa. In fact, tests such as the one mentioned
above would amount to nothing more than an attempted compromise between
Erie and the Rules, with the result that the same old problems will exist after
their adoption.
The only practical way to solve the existing problem is to break cleanly
with the past. For almost a century, incompatible doctrines have supported
substantive law and procedural law in the federal judicial system. Prior to
1938, Swift v. Tyson, with its theory for a uniform common law, controlled
substantive matters, while the Conformity Act, calling for the application of
state law, governed matters of procedure. In 1938, the situation was simply
reversed, so that conformity to state law has prevailed in substantive mat-
68. Horowitz, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins-A Test To Determine Those Rules of
State Law To Which Its Doctrine Applies, 23 So. CALIF. L. REv. 204, 215 (1950).
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ters under Erie while federal uniformity has been made to govern procedure.
The difficulties which have arisen have stemmed from the basic fact that it is
inherently impossible for these conflicting doctrines to receive compatible
application from federal courts, especially when the Supreme Court itself,
the promulgator of the Federal Rules and the architect of the Erie doc-
trine, refuses to establish any division between the two. Consequently, with-
out further ado, three suggestions will be made which it is believed should
be adopted in order to solve the problem and bring about a more harmonious
and desirable practice in the federal courts:
(1) The Supreme Court should promulgate a rule under the Enabling
Act, or Congress should pass a law, if necessary, which would make pro-
cedure in all diversity of citizenship cases conform as nearly as possible
to the procedure prescribed by the laws and decisions of the various states
in which federal courts sit. The Federal Rules would be repealed, but only
insofar as they affect actions based upon diversity of citizenship. This step
would eliminate the conflict which presently exists between federal pro-
cedure and the Erie doctrine, as well as the confusion and uncertainty which
exists among jurists and lawyers today as to which Rule might be over-
ruled or delimited by further extensions of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins. It seems
only logical that if a doctrine of state conformity is to govern substantive mat-
ters in diversity cases, a similar doctrine of state conformity must govern
procedure. This fact was recognized by Dean Gavit of Indiana, who concluded
in a recent article:
"The Federal Rules of" Civil Procedure should be amended to state what is in-
tended, or better yet they should state that in all diversity cases the Rules are not ap-
plicable, and that the district courts should in those cases follow the state law of
procedure. Nothing less than that will give proper recognition to a genuine State
Right to state procedure; nor will it be intelligible."
(2) The Federal Rules should be retained by the Supreme'Court to pre-
scribe procedure in all "strictly federal" civil actions. These actions would
include all except those founded upon diversity of citizenship, and those
governed by other rules, such as the admiralty rules. As a result, the Federal
Rules would be given a new lease on life, and under these conditions, they
should bring about a genuine uniformity in the well established federal field
of law. In this way, they would serve as a working model for the various
states which, in the future, choose to modernize their judicial procedure and
practice.
(3) The hope of so many for national uniformity in procedure need not
be discarded should the Supreme Court or Congress adopt the first suggestion
set forth above. Rather, it will become more desirable than ever before
69. Gavit, States' Rights and Federal Procedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1949).
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for the American Bar Association, and the various state bar associations, to
lead a fight for the passage of legislation in each State which would establish
modern rules of procedure in state courts, fashioned after the Federal Rules.
If such rules were made to govern procedure in each of the 48 states, the
result would be a nationally uniform procedure, applicable in both the
state and federal courts. This dream is not impossible of realization when one
stops to consider that almost all of the states have now adopted uniform
laws, such as the Negotiable Instruments Law and the Sales Act.
